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It is likely that novel zoonotic virus infections 
causing serious disease and death in humans will 
increasingly test our ability to respond appropri-
ately. Changes in commercial and social prac-
tices, the environment, and travel will continually 
provide new opportunities for zoonotic patho-
gens to infect humans. In addition, ever more 
sophisticated tools to detect novel pathogens will 
increase the chance that we will identify sporadic 
infections that do not cause widespread disease.
Zaki et al.1 now describe in the Journal the 
detection of a novel betacoronavirus (called 
HCoV-EMC) in a patient from Saudi Arabia who 
died of pneumonia and renal failure in June 
2012. A similar virus was detected in a second 
patient with severe pneumonia in Qatar.2 Astute 
clinicians recognized that these illnesses were 
unusual, with a severe progressive pneumonia in 
an otherwise healthy person. Pathogen-discovery 
tools for pan-coronaviruses, polymerase-chain-
reaction assay and sequence studies, detected 
the novel virus in both infections. In previous 
studies, similar betacoronaviruses have been de-
tected only in bats. In addition, serologic stud-
ies reported by Zaki et al. suggest that the virus 
had not circulated to a substantial degree in the 
affected community in Saudi Arabia.
The 2003 outbreak of the severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS) illustrates the epidemic 
potential of a novel coronavirus to threaten 
global health.3 That outbreak was also caused by 
a novel betacoronavirus (lineage B, as compared 
with the Saudi lineage C virus), which probably 
originated from bats and rapidly spread global-
ly, causing approximately 8000 cases and nearly 
800 deaths over 4 months.4
The global community has learned much from 
responding to past outbreaks. Four past respons-
es illustrate some of these lessons. The Nipah 
virus outbreak in Malaysia in 1998 and 1999 
showed the importance of an intermediate host 
— in that case, swine herds that amplified in-
fection and facilitated transmission to humans, 
resulting in a large outbreak. Epidemic control 
was mediated by eliminating spread from swine.5 
However, there have been continued infections 
when humans contacted infectious secretions 
from the bat reservoir species in contaminated 
date-palm sap.6 Since human-to-human trans-
mission of Nipah virus is inefficient, it has not 
yet presented a global health threat.
The SARS outbreak of 2003 and the pandem-
ic A (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus illustrate the 
potential for rapid global spread when a zoonotic 
virus acquires the ability to efficiently transmit 
from human to human. These outbreaks also 
show the speed and efficiency with which a 
global response can be mobilized to protect the 
public’s health. For both viruses, circulation in 
intermediate hosts — multiple species in wild-
animal markets for the SARS virus and swine 
for the pandemic A (H1N1) virus — and in hu-
mans allowed the viruses to adapt to human in-
fection and gain efficient human-to-human trans-
mission.7-9 The rarity of mild illness and lack of 
transmission early in the illness allowed public 
health control measures to stop the spread of 
SARS. Interestingly, since early 2004, SARS beta-
coronaviruses have not been reported in humans, 
possibly because control measures stopped trans-
mission in wild-animal markets. In contrast, 
the frequency of mild infection and greater effi-
ciency of human-to-human transmission pre-
cluded the control of the pandemic A (H1N1) 
virus, and it is now one of the endemic influ-
enza viruses.
In 1999, an astute clinician and public health 
officials noted an unusual cluster of cases of en-
cephalitis, and the subsequent investigation re-
sulted in the detection of West Nile virus shortly 
after it was introduced into the United States.10 
The virus had been endemic in Europe, Asia, 
and Africa but had not been previously detected 
in North America. With the mosquito vector in 
place and a previously unexposed bird popula-
tion, the virus quickly spread across North and 
Central America and is now one of the principal 
causes of viral encephalitis in the United States.11
In all four of these zoonotic infections, the 
initial clinical and epidemiologic investigations 
correctly guided the approach to response efforts, 
but ongoing surveillance and epidemiologic and 
laboratory investigations were needed to revise 
and fine-tune response efforts and develop ther-
apeutic and preventive approaches. Since there 
has been no evidence of human-to-human 
transmission or virus transmission to health 
care workers, HCoV-EMC is not currently a pub-
lic health risk.
The detection of HCoV-EMC, as described by 
Zaki et al., probably forecasts an increasingly 
common theme in which new pathogens are 
identified before they may develop the potential 
for efficient human-to-human transmission. 
From past experience, an astute clinician, public 
health official, or laboratory worker will recog-
nize an unusual event and contact the appropri-
ate health officials, who will investigate the 
event. Good communication between the clinic, 
laboratory, and public health community is im-
portant for rapid and effective assessment of the 
health risks.
Experience has shown that local investiga-
tion, if performed carefully and thoroughly, will 
correctly guide future response strategies. The 
dissemination of data on the clinical features 
of the illness allows for rapid case identifica-
tion and contact tracing. Assessing the risk of 
human-to-human transmission indicates the 
broader health risk from the pathogen. Cooper-
ation with the veterinary health community is 
essential in identifying the animal reservoirs and 
in establishing methods to prevent future intro-
ductions of the virus. Laboratory studies provide 
the tools to detect the pathogen and develop di-
agnostic assays to confirm acute infections and 
detect previous ones. The global community, 
represented by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), should be informed about cases in a 
timely fashion. The WHO can then lead the risk 
assessment and coordinate response efforts.12,13
The global community was apparently not 
aware of the first case of HCoV-EMC infection 
until it was reported on ProMED, a website for 
monitoring emerging diseases, on September 20, 
2012, approximately 3 months after the patient 
died. Luckily, there have been no new reports of 
cases since September 22, 2012, but local sur-
veillance should continue. With no evidence of 
human-to-human transmission, the WHO cur-
rently recommends no heightened global surveil-
lance for this virus but continued “routine sur-
veillance for early detection and rapid response to 
all potential public health threats.” However, 
such cases provide an opportunity to reconsider 
response strategies.
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